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RECENT LEGISLATION
Recent Legislation
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PoLICE POWER-VALIDITY OF STATUTE-PRACTICE
OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANCY WITHOUT CERTIFICATE.-An Illinois statute passed
in 1927 makes it unlawful to perform or offer to perform for the public
generally services which are included in the statutory definition of "public
accountant" without a certificate granted by the Department of Registra-
tion and Education, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1927, Ch. 110A, Sees. 7-9. The statute,
so far as it relates to the services coming within its scope, follows:
(1) Performing audits or preparing financial statements for mu-
nicipal corporations, public utilities, banks, building and loan associa-
tions, trust estates (except when employed by the cestui qui trust), in-
surance companies and charitable organizations which receive and dis-
pense funds donated by the public.
(2) Preparing or vouching for the accuracy of financial statements
or any business, knowing that such statements are to be used, (a) for
the information of stockholders or inactive or silent parties in such
business, (b) as an inducement to any person to invest in or extend
credit to such business, or (c) for filing in the office of the Secretary of
State under the provisions of the "Illinois Securities Act."
However, any of the acts described may be performed by one who does
not perform or offer to perform such acts for the public generally.
This statute was passed to replace a prior one held unconstitutional in
1926. Laws 1925, p. 505. The earlier statute provided that one is deemed
to be engaged in the practice of public accountancy "when he performs ac-
counting or auditing service as distinguished from bookkeeping, on a fee
basis, per diem or otherwise for more than one employer," and required a
certificate as a condition precedent to the practice of the business of public
accounting. It was held unconstitutional as an unreasonable exercise of the
police power. Frazer v. Shelton (1926), 320 Ill. 253, 150 N. E. 696, 43
A. L. R. 1086. In accord with the Frazer case is State v. Riedell (1924),
109 Okla. 35, 233 P. 684, 42 A. L. R. 765.
It is well settled that a state may prohibit one from holding himself out
as a certified public accountant without first having met the statutory re-
quirements, on the ground that it is to the public interest that no one shall
use a term indicating that he has been examined and certified as an ac-
countant when such is not the fact. Lehmann v. State Board of Public Ac-
countancy (1922), 208 Ala. 185, 94 So. 94; Henry v. State (1924), 97 Tex.
Cr. R. 67, 260 S. W. 190; People v. Marlowe (1923), App. Div. 203 N. Y. S.
474. However, none of these cases goes to the length of holding that the state
may prohibit the practice of the profession by one who does not hold the cer-
tificate. They merely hold it constitutional to restrict the use of the term
"certified." The only possible basis for upholding the constitutionality of the
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1927 statute is that it is a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
"The term 'police power' comprehends the power to make and enforce all
wholesome and reasonable laws and regulations necessary to maintain the
public health, comfort, safety, and welfare." F'azer v. Shelton, supra; State
ex orel. Short v. Riedell, supra. A citizen has the right to pursue ordinary
trades or callings, subject, however, to the reasonable exercise of the police
power. Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897), 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. Ed. 832, 17 S.
Ct. 427. The question in each case is whether the business regulated affects
the public health, comfort, safety, or welfare. It is undisputed that such
professions as medicine or law do affect the public welfare. As for ac-
countancy, can it be said to create any perceptible effect upon the public?
True, an audit of a municipal corporation is a matter of public concern, but
the work of the accountant in a private business does not ordinarily affect
the public welfare. Thus, the effect of the 1925 statute was to restrict the
right of the owner of the business to make a private contract (that business
being only of private concern) and also to deprive accountants not certified
of the right to follow the occupation for which they qualified themselves by
the expenditure of time and work.
The 1927 statute attempts to limit the scope of the earlier definition of a
public accountant. So far as it concerns the making of audits for munic-
ipal corporations, it is no doubt valid. Once it goes beyond that each sec-
tion must be carefully scrutinized to determine whether the business does
in fact affect the public welfare. "In order to say that private business
must, in the interest of public welfare, employ one certified by the state, it
must appear that the effect of an audit of that business is a matter of pub-
lic welfare and not of private concern." Frazer v. Shelton, supra. Ap-
plying this test, it is possible that (a) and (b) of (2) may be held invalid,
and portions of (1) are near the border line. J. N., '29.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-VAuDITY OF DEATH PENALTY FOu ROBBERY.-The
increasing severity of recent punitive legislation is evidenced by an act of
the Missouri Legislature making robbery with a deadly weapon punishable
by death. This recent addition to the similar legislation of other states
providing for more severe punishment for the convicted felon reads as fol-
lows:
Sec. 3310. Every person convicted of robbery in the first degree by
means of a dangerous and deadly weapon shall suffer death, or be pun-
ished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than ten years.
Laws of 1927, p. 174.
Previously, Sec. 3310, R. S. Mo. 1919, had provided for a sentence of im-
prisonment in the penitentiary for not less than five years for any person
convicted of robbery in the first degree. Several states have laws providing
for the infliction of the death penalty as the maximum sentence for persons
convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon. Old. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1926,
Secs. 1793-1801; Tex. Revised Crim. Stat. 1925, Sec. 1408. Alabama, how-
ever, does not distinguish between robbery with or without a deadly weapon,
making this crime punishable "at the discretion of the jury, by death, or by
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